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CRYPTO TOPICS AND APPLICATIONS IJennifer Seberry, Chris Charnes, Josef Pieprzyk, and Rei Safavi-NainiCentre for Computer Security Research, University of Wollongong1 INTRODUCTIONIn this chapter we discuss four related areas of cryptology, namely: Authentication, Hashing,Message Authentication Codes (MACs), and Digital Signatures. These topics represent currentlyactive and growing research topics in cryptology. Due to space limitations, we concentrate onlyon the essential aspects of each topic. The bibliography is intended to supplement our survey.We have included suciently many items to provide the interested reader with an overall viewof the current state of knowledge in the above areas.Authentication deals with the problem of providing assurance to a receiver that a communi-cated message originates from a particular transmitter, and that the received message has thesame content as the transmitted message. A typical authentication scenario occurs in com-puter networks, where the identity of two communicating entities is established by means ofauthentication.Hashing is concerned with the problem of providing a relatively short ngerprint of a muchlonger message or electronic document. A hashing function must satisfy (at least) the criticalrequirement that the ngerprints of two distinct messages are distinct. Hashing functions havenumerous applications in cryptology. They are often taken as primitives in constructing othercryptographic functions.Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are symmetric key primitives that provide message in-tegrity against active spoong by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message which isveriable only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication is one of themost important ways of ensuring the integrity of information which is transferred by electronicmeans.Digital signatures provide electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They preserve theessential features of handwritten signatures, and can be used to sign electronic documents.Digital signatures can potentially be used in legal contexts.2 AUTHENTICATIONOne of the main goals of a cryptographic system is to provide authentication, which simplymeans providing assurance about the content and origin of communicated messages.Historically, cryptography began with secret writing and this remained the main area of develop-ment until very recently. With the rapid progress in data communication, the need for providingmessage integrity and authenticity has escalated to the extent that currently authentication isseen as the more urgent goal of cryptographic systems.1
Traditionally, it was assumed that a secrecy system provides authentication by the virtue of thesecret key being only known by the intended communicants; this would prevent an enemy fromconstructing a fraudulent message. Simmons [66] argued that the two goals of cryptographyare independent. He shows that a system that provides perfect secrecy might not provide anyprotection against authentication threats. Similarly, a system can provide perfect authenticationwithout concealing messages.In the rest of this chapter, we use the term communication system to encompass message trans-mission as well as storage. The system consists of a transmitter who wants to send a message, areceiver who is the intended recipient of the message, and an enemy who attempts to constructa fraudulent message with the aim of getting it accepted by the receiver unwittingly. In somecases, there is a fourth party, called the arbiter, whose basic role is to provide protection againstcheating by the transmitter and/or the receiver. The communication is assumed to take placeover a public channel, and hence the communicated messages can be seen by all the principals.An authentication threat is an attempt by an enemy in the system to modify a communicatedmessage or inject a fraudulent message into the channel. In a secrecy system the attacker ispassive, while in an authentication system the enemy is active and not only observes the com-municated messages and gathers information such as plaintext and ciphertext, but also activelyinteracts with the system to achieve its goal. This view of the system clearly explains Simmons'motivation for basing authentication systems on game theory.The most important criteria that can be used to classify authentication systems are: the relation between authenticity and secrecy; the framework for the security analysis.The rst criterion divides authentication systems into those that provide authentication with andwithout secrecy. The second criterion divides systems into systems with unconditional security,systems with computational security and systems with provable security. Unconditional securityimplies that the enemy has unlimited computational power, while in computational security theenemy's resources are limited and the security relies on the required computation exceedingthe enemy's computational power. A system with provable security is in fact a subclass ofcomputationally secure systems and its compromise is equivalent to a solution of a known dicultproblem.These two classications are orthogonal and produce four subclasses. Below we review thebasic concepts of authentication theory, some known bounds and constructions in unconditionalsecurity, and then consider computational security.2.1 Unconditional securityA basic model introduced by Simmons [66] has remained the mainstay of most of the theoreticalresearch on authentication systems. The model has the same structure as described in the pre-vious section but excludes the arbiter. To provide protection against an enemy, the transmitterand receiver use an authentication code (A-code). An A-code is a collection E of mappings calledencoding rules (also called keys) >from a set S of source states (also called transmitter states)into the set M of cryptogram (also called codewords). For A-codes without secrecy, also calledcartesian A-codes, a codeword uniquely determines a source state. That is, the set of codewords2
is partitioned into subsets each corresponding to a distinct source state. In a systematic carte-sian A-code, M = S  T where T is a set of authentication tags and each codeword is of theform s:t; s 2 S; t 2 T where `.' denotes concatenation. Let the cardinality of the set S of sourcestates be denoted as k; that is, jSj = k. Let E = jEj and M = jMj. The encoding process addskey dependent redundancy to the message, so k < M . A key (or encoding rule) e determines asubset Me M of codewords that are authentic under e.The incidence matrix A of an A-code is a binary matrix of size E M whose rows are labeledby encoding rules and columns by codewords, such that A(e;m) = 1 if m is a valid codewordunder e, and A(e;m) = 0, otherwise.An authentication matrix B of a cartesian A-code is a matrix of size E  k whose rows arelabeled by the encoding rules and columns by the source states, and B(e; s) = t if t is the tagfor the source state s under the encoding rule e.To use the system, the transmitter and receiver must secretly share an encoding rule. The enemydoes not know the encoding rule and uses an impersonation attack, in which it only uses itsknowledge of the system, or a substitution attack in which it waits to see a transmitted codeword,and then constructs a fraudulent codeword. The security of the system is measured in termsof the enemy's chance of success with the chosen attack. The enemy's chance of success in animpersonation attack is denoted by P0, and in a substitution attack by P1. The best chance anenemy has in succeeding in either of the above attacks is called the probability of deception, Pd.An attack is said to be spoong of order ` if the enemy has seen ` communicated codewordsunder a single key. The enemy's chance of success in this case is denoted by P`.The chance of success can be dened using two dierent approaches. The rst approach cor-responds to an average case analysis of the system and can be described as the enemy's payoin the game theory model. It has been used by a number of authors, including MacWilliams,Gilbert and Sloane [32], Fak [28], and Simmons [66]. The second is to consider the worst casescenario. This approach is based on the relation between A-codes and error correcting codes(also called E-codes).Using the game theory model, Pj is the value of a zero-sum game between communicants andthe enemy. For impersonation P0 = maxm2M(payo(m));and for substitution P1 = EXj=1 Xm2MP (m)maxm0 payo(m;m0);where P (m) is the probability of a codeword m occurring in the channel, and payo(m;m0) isthe enemy's payo (best chance of success) when it substitutes an intercepted codeword m witha fraudulent one, m0.2.2 Bounds on the performance of the A-codeThe rst types of bounds relate the main parameters of an A-code, that is, E;M; k, and henceare usually called combinatorial bounds. The most important combinatorial bound for A-codeswith secrecy is Pi  k   iM   i ; i = 1; 2; : : :3
and for A-codes without secrecy is Pi  k=M; i = 1; 2; : : : :An A-code that satises these bounds with equality, that is, with Pi = k   iM   i for A-codes withsecrecy and Pi = k=M for cartesian A-codes, is said to provide perfect protection for spoongof order i. The enemy's best strategy in spoong of order i for such an A-code is to randomlyselect one of the remaining codewords.A-codes that provide perfect protection for all orders of spoong up to r are said to be r-foldsecure. These codes can be characterized using combinatorial structures such as orthogonalarrays and t-designs.An orthogonal array OA(t; k; v) is an array with vt rows, each row of size k, from the elementsof set X of v symbols, such that in any t columns of the array every t-tuple of elements of Xoccurs in exactly  rows. Usually t is referred to as the strength of the OA.Example 1 The following table gives a OA2(2; 5; 2) on the set f0; 1g:0 0 0 0 01 1 0 0 00 0 0 1 11 1 0 1 11 0 1 0 10 1 1 0 11 0 1 1 00 1 1 1 0A t-(v; k; ) design is a collection of b subsets, each of size k, of a set, X , of size v where everydistinct subset of size t occurs exactly  times.The incidence matrix of a t-(v; k; ) is a binary matrix, A = (aij), of size b v such that aij = 1if element j is in block i and 0 otherwise.Example 2 The following table gives a 3-(8; 4; 1) design on the set f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g:7 0 1 37 1 2 47 2 3 57 3 4 67 4 5 07 5 6 17 6 0 22 4 5 63 5 6 04 6 0 15 0 1 26 1 2 30 2 3 41 3 4 54
with incidence matrix: 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 10 1 1 0 1 0 0 10 0 1 1 0 1 0 10 0 0 1 1 0 1 11 0 0 0 1 1 0 10 1 0 0 0 1 1 11 0 1 0 0 0 1 10 0 1 0 1 1 1 01 0 0 1 0 1 1 01 1 0 0 1 0 1 01 1 1 0 0 1 0 00 1 1 1 0 0 1 01 0 1 1 1 0 0 00 1 0 1 1 1 0 0The main theorems relating A-codes with r-fold security and combinatorial structures are dueto a number of authors, including Stinson [69], and Tombak and Safavi-Naini [77]. The followingare the most general forms of these theorems.Theorem 1 ([77]) Let the source be r-fold uniform. Then an A-code provides r-fold securityagainst spoong if and only if the incidence matrix of the code is the incidence matrix of a(r+ 1)- (M; k; ) design.In the above theorem, an r-fold uniform source is a source for which every string of r distinctoutputs from the source has probability 1k(k   1)   (k   r + 1).Theorem 2 Let P0 = P1 = P2 =    = Pr = k=M . Then the authentication matrix is aOA(r+ 1; k; `) where ` = M=k.The so-called information theoretic bounds characterize the enemy's chance of success usinguncertainty measures. The rst such bound for cartesian A-codes, derived by MacWilliams,Gilbert and Sloane [32], is P1  2 H(M)2where H(M) is the entropy of the codeword space. The rst general bound on P0, due toSimmons [66], is P0  2 (H(E) H(EjM))where H(E) is the entropy of the key space and H(EjM) is the conditional entropy of the keywhen a codeword is intercepted. Write I(E;M) for the mutual information of E and M . Then,P0  2I(E;M):The above bound relates the enemy's best chance of success to the mutual information betweenthe cryptogram space and the key space. A general form of this bound, proved independentlyby Rosenbaum [63] and Pei [47], is 5
P`  2I(E;M `);where I(E;M `) is the mutual information between a string of ` codewords, and where m` is thekey.Similar bounds for A-codes without secrecy are proved by MacWilliams et al [32] and by Walker[79].A general bound on the probability of deception, Pdr , derived by Rosenbaum [63], isPdr  2 H(E)r+1 :2.3 Other types of attackTombak and Safavi-Naini [76] consider other types of attacks, similar to those for secrecy sys-tems. In a plaintext attack against A-codes with secrecy, the enemy not only knows the codewordbut also knows the corresponding plaintext. In chosen content attack the enemy wants to suc-ceed with a codeword that has a prescribed plaintext. It is shown that by applying sometransformation on the A-code it is possible to provides immunity against the above attacks.A-codes with secrecy are generally more dicult to analyze than cartesian A-codes. Moreover,the verication process for the former is not as ecient. In the case of cartesian A-codes,verication of a received codeword, s:t, amounts to recalculating the tag using the secret keyand the source state s to obtain t0 and comparing it with the received tag t. For an authenticcodeword we have t = t0. In the case of A-codes with secrecy, when a codeword m is received,the receiver must try all authentic codewords using his secret key, otherwise there must be aninverse algorithm that allows the receiver to nd and verify the source state. The former processis costly and the latter does not exist for a general A-code. For practical reasons, the majorityof research has concentrated on cartesian A-codes.2.4 EciencyAuthentication systems require secure transmission of key information prior to the communi-cation and hence, similar to secrecy systems, it is desirable to have a small number of keybits.Rees and Stinson [60] prove that: for any (M; k;E) A-code which is 1-fold secure, E M . ForA-codes with secrecy that provide one-fold security, Stinson [69] shows that:E  M2  Mk2   k :Under similar conditions for cartesian A-codes, Stinson [69] shows that:E  k(`  1) + 1where ` = k=M . 6
For A-codes with r-fold security, Stinson [71] shows that:E  M(M   1)   (M   r)k(k   1)   (k   r) :An A-code provides perfect authenticity of order r if Pdr = k=M . In such codes the probabilityof success of the spoofer does not improve with the interception of extra codewords.The following bound is established by Tombak and Safavi-Naini [75] for codes of the above type:E  M r+1kr+1 :Their bound shows that the provision of perfect authenticity requires logM   log k extra keybits on average for every added order of spoong. Hence using the same key for authenticationof more than one message is expensive.A second measure of eciency, often used for systematic cartesian A-codes, is the size of thetag space for a xed size of source space and probability of success in substitution. Stinson [72]shows that, for perfect protection against substitution, the size of key space grows linearly withthe size of the source. Johansson, Kabatianskii and Smeets [37] show that: if P1 > P0, A-codeswith an exponential (in E) number of source states can be obtained.2.5 A-codes and E-codesAn error correcting code provides protection against random channel error The study of errorcorrecting codes was motivated by Shannon's channel capacity theorem and has been a veryactive research area since the early 1950s. Error correcting codes add redundancy to a messagein such a way that a codeword corrupted by the channel noise can be detected and/or corrected.The main dierence between an A-code and an E-code is that in the former redundancy dependson a secret key while in the latter it only depends on the message being coded. There exists aduality between authentication codes and error correcting codes. In the words of Simmons [66],\ .. one (coding theory) is concerned with clustering the most likely alterations as closely aboutthe original code as possible and the other (authentication theory) with spreading the optimal(to the opponent) alterations as uniformly as possible over M."The relation between E-codes and A-codes is explored in the work of Johansson et al [37], whoshow that it is possible to construct E-codes from A-codes and vice-versa. Their work usesa worst case analysis approach in analyzing the security of A-codes. That is, in the case ofsubstitution attack, they consider the best chance of success an enemy has when it intercepts allpossible codewords. This contrasts with the information theoretic (or game theory) approachin which the average success probability of the enemy over all possible intercepted codewords iscalculated.The work of Johansson et al is especially useful as it allows the well developed body of boundsand asymptotic results from the theory of error correcting codes to be employed in the contextof authentication codes, to derive upper and lower bounds on the size of the source for A-codeswith given E, T , and P1. 7
2.6 Authentication with arbiterIn the basic model of authentication discussed above, the enemy is an outsider and we assumethat the transmitter and the receiver are trustworthy. Moreover, because the key is sharedby the transmitter and the receiver, the two principals are cryptographically indistinguishable.In an attempt to model authentication systems in which the transmitter and the receiver aredistinguished and to remove assumptions about the trustworthiness of the two, Simmons [66]introduced a fourth principal called the arbiter. The transmitter and receiver have dierentkeys and the arbiter has access to all or part of the key information. The system has a keydistribution phase during which keys satisfying certain conditions are chosen. After that thereis a transmission phase during which the transmitter uses its key to produce a codeword andnally a dispute phase during which disputes are resolved with the aid of the arbiter. The arbiterin Simmons' model is active during the transmission phase and is assumed to be trustworthy.Yung and Desmedt [83] remove this assumption and consider a model in which the arbiter isonly trusted to resolve disputes. Johansson [35] and Kurosawa [39] derive lower bounds on theprobability of deception in such codes. Johansson [36] and Taylor [73] propose constructions.2.7 Shared generation of authenticatorsMany applications require the power to generate an authentic message and/or to verify theauthenticity of a message to be be distributed among a number of principals. An example ofsuch a situation is multiple signatures in a bank account or court room. Desmedt and Frankel[25] introduced systems with shared generation of authenticators (SGA-systems), which havebeen studied in recent papers by: Safavi-Naini [64], Gehrmann, van Dijk and Smeets, [29], andSafavi-Naini and Martin [65]. In such systems there is a group P of transmitters created withan structure   that determines authorized subsets of P . Each principal has a secret key whichis used to generate a partial tag. The system has two phases. In the key distribution phase,a trusted authority generates keys for the transmitters and the receivers and securely deliversthe keys to them. In the communication phase, the trusted authority is not active. When anauthorized group of transmitters wants to construct an authentic codeword, using its key, eachgroup member generates a partial tag for the source state s which needs to be authenticated,and sends it to a combiner. The combiner is a xed algorithm with no secret input. It combinesits inputs to produce a tag, t, to be appended to s. The receiver is able to authenticate thiscodeword using its secret key. Safavi-Naini and Martin [65] give a general construction for SGA-systems by combining A-codes and secret sharing schemes. Gehrmann et al [29] propose anecient construction for SGA-systems, based on maximum rank distance separable codes.2.8 Multiple authenticationAs noted before, in the theory of A-codes the possible attacks by the enemy are limited to im-personation and substitution. This means that the security of the system is only for one messagecommunication; after that the key must be changed. To extend protection over more than onemessage transmission, there exist a number of alternatives. The most obvious ones use A-codesthat provide perfect protection against spoong of order `. However, little is known about theconstruction of such codes and it is preferable to use A-codes that provide protection againstsubstitution for more that one message transmission. Vanroose, Smeets and Wan [82] suggestkey strategies in which the communicants change their key after each transmitted codeword,8
using some pre-specied strategy. In this case the key information shared by the communicantsis the sequence of keys to be used for consecutive transmission slots. The resulting boundson the probability of deception generalize the bounds given by the following authors: Pei [47],Rosenbaum [63], and Walker [79].Another successful approach proposed by Wegman and Carter [80] uses a special class of hashfunctions together with a one time pad of random numbers. This construction is discussed inmore detail in Section 5.3 Computationally secure systemsThe study of computationally secure A-systems is relatively informal, cf. Simmons [67]. Thebasic framework is similar to unconditionally secure systems. A simple computationally secureA-code can be obtained by considering S = GF (240) and M = GF (264). We use E to be thethe collection of DES [51] encryption functions and so E = 256. To construct the codewordcorresponding to a source state s, using the key k, we append 24 zeros to s and then use DESwith key k to encrypt s:024, where 024 is the string of 24 zeros.It is easy to see that the above scheme is an A-code with secrecy. It allows the receiver to easilyverify the authenticity of a received codeword by decrypting a received codeword and checkingthe existence of the string of zeros. If an enemy wants to impersonate the transmitter itschance of success is 2 56, which is the probability of guessing the correct key. For a substitutionattack, the enemy waits to see a transmitted codeword. Then it uses all the keys to decrypt thecodeword and once a decryption of the right form (ending in 24 zeros) is obtained, a possiblekey is found. In general there is more than one key with this property. On the average thereare 256  240=264 = 232 pairs (s; k) that produce the same cryptogram and hence the chance ofguessing correctly is 2 32. A better strategy for the enemy is to randomly choose a cryptogramand send it to the receiver. In this case his chance of success is 2 24, which is better than theprevious case.The security of computationally secure A-systems weakens very quickly as the enemy interceptsmore cryptograms. Trying all possible keys on ` received cryptograms enables the enemy touniquely identify the key, in which case the enemy's chance of success is one.Computationally secure A-systems without secrecy are obtained by appending an authenticatorto the message which is veriable by the intended receiver. The authenticator can be producedby a symmetric key algorithm or an asymmetric key algorithm. The former is the subject of thesection on Message Authentication Codes (MAC), while the latter is discussed in the section ondigital signatures.4 HASHINGIn many cryptographic applications, it is necessary to produce a relatively short ngerprintof a much longer message or electronic document. The ngerprint is also called a digest ofthe message. Ideally, a hash function should produce a unique digest of a xed length for amessage of an arbitrary length. Obviously, this is impossible as any hash function is, in fact, a9
many-to-one mapping. The properties required for secure hashing can be summarized as follows: hashing should be a many-to-one function producing a digest which is a complex functionof all bits of the message; a hash function should behave as a random function which creates a digest for a givenmessage by randomly choosing an element from the whole digest space; for any pair of messages, it should be computationally dicult to nd a collision; i.e.distinct messages with the same digest; and a hash function should be one-way; i.e. it should be easy to compute the digest of a givenmessage but dicult to determine the message corresponding to a given digest.The main requirement of secure hashing is that it should be collision-free in the sense thatnding two colliding messages is computationally intractable. This requirement must hold forlong as well as short messages.4.1 Strong and weak hash functionsHash functions can be broadly classied into two classes: strong one-way hash functions (alsocalled collision-free hash functions) and weak one-way hash functions (also known as universalone-way hash functions). A strong one-way hash function is a function h satisfying the followingconditions:1. h can be applied to any message or document M of any size;2. h produces a xed size digest;3. Given h and M , it is easy to compute the digest h(M); and4. Given h, it is computationally infeasible to nd two distinct messages M1;M2 which collide,i.e. h(M1) = h(M2).On the other hand, a weak one-way hash function is a function that satises conditions (1), (2),(3) and the following:4'. Given h and a randomly chosen messageM , it is computationally intractable to nd anothermessage M 0 which collides with M , i.e. h(M) = h(M 0).Strong one-way hash functions are easier to use since there is no precondition on the selection ofthe messages. On the other hand, for weak one-way hash functions, there is no guarantee thata non-random selection of two messages is collision-free. This means that the space of easilyfound colliding messages must be small. Otherwise, a random selection of two messages wouldproduce a collision with a non-negligible probability.10
4.2 Theoretic ConstructionsNaor and Yung [44] introduced the concept of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) andsuggested a construction based on a one-way permutation. In their construction, they employthe notion of a universal family of functions with collision accessibility property [80]. The abovefunctions are dened as follows.Denition 1 Suppose G = fg j A! Bg is a set of functions. G is strongly universalr if givenany r distinct elements a1; : : : ; ar 2 A, and any r elements b1; : : : ; br 2 B, there are jGj/jBj2functions which take a1 to b1, a2 to b2 etc. (jGj and jBj denote the cardinality of sets G and B,respectively.)Denition 2 A strongly universalr family of functions G has the collision accessibility propertyif it is possible to generate in polynomial time a function g 2 G that satises the equations:g(ai) = bi; 1  i  r:Naor and Yung construct a family of UOWHF's by concatenating any one-way permutationwith a family of strongly universal2 hash functions having the collision accessibility property. Inthis construction, the one-way permutation provides the one-wayness of the UOWHF, and thestrongly universal2 family of hash functions provides the mapping to the small length output.When a function is chosen randomly and uniformly >from the family, the output is distributedrandomly and uniformly over the output space.Zheng, Matsumoto and Imai [84] dene a scheme based on the composition of a pairwise in-dependent uniformizer and a strongly universal hash function with a quasi-injection one-wayfunction.De Santis and Yung [24] construct hash functions from one-way functions with an almost-knownpreimage size. In other words, if an element of the domain is given, then with a polynomialuncertainty an estimate of the size of the preimage set is easily computable. A regular functionis an example of such a function. (In a regular function, each image of an n-bit input has thesame number of preimages of length n.)Rompel [62] constructs a UOWHF from any one-way function. His construction is rather elab-orate. Briey, his idea is to transform any one-way function into a UOWHF through a sequenceof complicated procedures. First, the one-way function is transformed into another one-wayfunction such that for most elements of the domain except for a fraction, it is easy to nd acollision. >From this, another one-way function is constructed such that for most of the elementsit is hard to nd a collision. Subsequently, a length increasing one-way function is constructedfor which it is hard to nd collisions almost everywhere. Finally, this is turned into a UOWHFwhich compresses the input in a way that makes it dicult to nd a collision (cf. Pieprzyk andSadeghiyan [49]).4.3 Hashing based on block ciphersTo minimize the design eort for cryptographically secure hash functions, the designers of hashfunctions tend to base their schemes on existing encryption algorithms. For example, sequentialhashing can be obtained by dividing a given message into blocks and applying an encryption11
algorithm on the message blocks. The message block length must be the same as the blocklength of the encryption algorithm. If the message length is not a multiple of the block length,then the last block is usually padded with some redundant bits. To provide a randomizingelement, an initial public vector is normally used. The proof of the security of such schemesrelies on the collision freeness of the underlying encryption algorithm.In the following, let E denote an arbitrary encryption algorithm. Let E(K;M) denote theencryption of message M with key K using E; let IV denote the initial vector.Rabin [55] shows that any private-key cryptosystem can be used for hashing. Rabin's scheme isthe following. First the message is divided into blocks M1;M2; : : : of the same size as the blocklength of of the encryption algorithm. In the case of DES, the message is divided into 64-bitblocks. To hash a message M = (M1;M2; : : : ;Mt), the following computations are performed:H0 = IVHi = E(Mi; Hi 1) i = 1; 2; : : : ; tH(M) = Htwhere Mi is a message block, Hi are intermediate results of hashing, and H(M) is the digest.Although Rabin's scheme is simple and elegant, it is susceptible to the so-called birthday attackwhen the size of the hash value is 64 bits.Winternitz [81] proposes a scheme for the construction of a one-way hash function >from anyblock cipher. In any good block cipher, given an input and an output, it should be dicultto determine the key, but from the the key and the output it should be easy to determine theinput. The scheme uses an operation E dened by:E(K kM) = E(K;M)M:Based on the above scheme, Davies [23] proposes the following hashing algorithm:H0 = IVHi = E(Mi; Hi 1)Hi 1 i = 1; 2; : : : ; tH(M) = Ht:If E(K;M) is DES, then it may be vulnerable to attacks based on weak keys or a key-collisionsearch. The meet-in-the-middle attack is thwarted because E(K;M) is a one-way function.Merkle [43, 42] proposed hashing schemes based on Winternitz's construction. These schemesuse DES to produce digests of size  128 bits. Their construction follows a general method forconstructing hash algorithms, called the meta method. This is the same as the serial method ofDamgard [22]. The description of the method is as follows. The message is rst divided intoblocks of 106 bits. Each 106-bit block Mi of data is concatenated with the 128-bit block Hi 1.The concatenation Xi = Mi k Hi 1 contains 234 bits. Each block Xi is further divided intohalves, Xi1 and Xi2. H0 = IVXi = Hi 1 kMiHi = E(00 k rst 59 bits offE(100 k X1i)g krst 59 bits offE(101 k X2i)g) kE(01 k rst 59 bits offE(110 k X1i)g k12
rst 59 bits offE(111 k X2i)g)H(M) = Ht:In this scheme E is dened as in Winternitz's construction. The strings 00, 01, 100, 101, 110,and 111 above are used to prevent the manipulation of weak keys.4.4 Hashing functions based on intractable problemsHashing functions can also be based on one-way functions such as: exponentiation, squaring,knapsack (cf. Pieprzyk and Sadeghiyan [49]), and discrete logarithm. More recently, a group-theoretic construction using the SL2 groups has been proposed by Tillich and Zemor [74].A scheme based on RSA exponentiation as the underlying one-way function is dened by:H0 = IVHi = (Hi 1 Mi)e mod N i = 1; 2; : : : ; tH(M) = Htwhere the modulus N and the exponent e are public. A correcting block attack can be usedto compromise the scheme by appending or inserting a carefully selected last block message toachieve a desired hash value. To immunize the scheme against this attack, it is necessary to addredundancy to the message so that the last message block cannot be manipulated (cf. Daviesand Price [23]). To ensure the security of RSA, N should be at least 512 bits in length, makingthe implementation of the above scheme very slow.To improve the performance of the above scheme, the public exponent can be made small. Forexample, squaring can be used: Hi = (Hi 1 Mi)2 mod N:It is suggested that 64 bits of every message block be set to 0, to avoid a correcting block attack.An algorithm for hashing based on squaring is proposed in Appendix D of the X.509 recom-mendations of the CCITT standards on secure message handling. The proposal stipulates that256 bits of redundancy be distributed over every 256-bit message block by interleaving everyfour bits of the message with 1111, so that the total number of bits in each block becomes 512.The exponentiation algorithm, with exponent two, is then run on the modied message in CBCmode (cf. Pieprzyk and Sadeghiyan [49]). In this scheme, the four most signicant bits of everybyte in each block are set to 1. Coppersmith [20] shows how to construct colliding messages inthis scheme.Damgard [22] describes a scheme based on squaring, which maps a block of n bits into a blockof m bits. The scheme is dened by:H0 = IVHi = extract(00111111 k Hi 1 kMi)2 mod NH(M) = Ht:In the above scheme, the role of extract is to extract m bits >from the result of the squaringfunction. To obtain a secure scheme, m should be suciently large so as to thwart the birthdayattack; this attack will be explained later. Moreover, extract should select bits for which nding13
colliding inputs is dicult. One way to do this is to extract m bits uniformly. However, forpractical reasons, it is better to bind them together in bytes. Another possibility is to extractevery fourth byte. Daemen, Govaerts and Vanderwalle [21] show that this scheme can be broken.Impagliazzo and Naor [34] propose a hashing function based on the knapsack problem. Thedescription of the scheme is as follows. Choose at random numbers a1; : : : ; an in the interval0; : : : ; N , where n indicates the length of the message in bits, and N = 2`   1 where ` < n. Abinary message M = M1;M2; : : : ;Mn is hashed asH(M) = nXi=1 aiMi mod 2`:Impagliazzo and Naor do not give any concrete parameters for the above scheme, but they haveshown that it is theoretically sound.Gibson [31] constructs hash functions whose security is conditional upon the diculty of factoringcertain numbers. The hash function is dened by:f(x) = ax (mod n);where n = pq, p and q are large primes, and a is a primitive element of the ring Zn. In Gibson'shash function n has to suciently large to ensure the diculty of factoring. This constraintmakes the hash function considerably slower than the MD4 algorithm.Tillich and Zemor [74] propose a hashing scheme where the message digests are given by two-dimensional matrices with entries in the binary Galois elds GF (2n) for 130  n  170. Thehashing functions are parameterized by the irreducible polynomials of degree n, Pn(X), overGF (2); their choice is left to the user. Their scheme has several provably secure properties:detection of local modication of text; and resistance to the birthday attack as well as a fewother attacks. Hashing is fast as digests are produced by matrix multiplication in GF (2n), whichcan be parallelized.Messages (encoded as a binary strings) x1x2 : : : of arbitrary length are mapped to products ofa selected pair of generators fA;Bg of the group SL(2; 2n), as follows:xi = ( A if xi = 0B if xi = 1.The resulting product belongs to the (innite) group SL(2; GF (2)[X]), where GF (2)[X ] is thering of all polynomials over GF (2). The product is then reduced modulo an irreducible polyno-mial of degree n (Euclidean algorithm), mapping it to an element of SL(2; 2n). The four n-bitentries of the reduced matrix give the (3n+ 1)-bit message digest of x1x2 : : : :Charnes and Pieprzyk [15] show that irreducible polynomials which produce collisions for theSL2 hash functions can be found. Other weaknesses of this scheme are explored in a later paperavailable from them [17]. The weak parameters are characterized; they can be computed withthe algorithms given there.Geiselmann [30] describes an algorithm to produce potential collisions for the SL2 hashingscheme, independent of the choice of the irreducible polynomials. The complexity of his algo-rithm is that of the discrete logarithm problem in GF (2n) or GF (22n). However, no collisionsin the specied range of the hash function have been found using this algorithm. Some pairs ofrather long colliding strings are given by Geiselmann for a toy example of GF (221).14
4.5 Hashing algorithmsRivest [58] proposes a hashing algorithm called MD4. It is a software oriented scheme which isespecially designed to be fast on 32-bit machines. The algorithm produces a 128-bit output, so itis not computationally feasible to produce twomessages having the same hash value. The schemeprovides diusion and confusion using three boolean functions. The MD5 hashing algorithm isa strengthened version of MD4 [57]. MD4 has been broken by Dobbertin [26].HAVAL stands for a one-way hashing algorithm with a variable length of output. It was designedat the University of Wollongong by Zheng, Pieprzyk and Seberry [85]. It compresses a messageof an arbitrary length into a digest of either 128, 160, 192, 224 or 256 bits. The security levelcan be adjusted by selecting 3, 4 or 5 passes. The structure of HAVAL is based on MD4 andMD5. Unlike MD4 and MD5 whose basic operations are done using functions of three booleanvariables, HAVAL employs ve boolean functions of seven variables (each function serves a singlepass). All functions used in HAVAL are highly nonlinear, 0-1 balanced, linearly inequivalent,mutually output-uncorrelated and satisfy the Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC). No attack onHAVAL has been reported so far.Charnes and Pieprzyk [14] proposed a modied version of HAVAL based on ve boolean functionsof ve variables. The resulting hashing algorithm is faster than the ve pass, seven variableversion of the original HAVAL algorithm. They use the same cryptographic criteria which areused to select the boolean functions in the original scheme. Unlike the seven variable case, thechoice of the boolean functions is fairly restricted in the modied setting. Using the shortestalgebraic normal form of the boolean functions as one of the criteria (to maximize the speedof processing), it is shown that the boolean functions used are optimal. No attacks have beenreported for the ve variable version.4.6 AttacksThe best method to evaluate a hashing scheme is to see what attacks an adversary can perform tond collisions. A good hashing algorithm produces a xed length number which depends on allthe bits of the message. It is generally assumed that the adversary knows the hashing algorithm.In a conservative approach, it is assumed that the adversary can perform an adaptive chosenmessage attack, where it may choose messages, ask for their digests, and try to compute collidingmessages. There are several methods for using such pairs to attack a hashing scheme and tocalculate colliding messages. Some methods are quite general and can be applied against anyhashing scheme; for example, the so-called birthday attack. Other methods are applicable onlyto specic hashing schemes. Some attacks can be used against a wide range of hash functions.For example, the so-called meet-in-the-middle attack is applicable to any scheme that uses somesort of block chaining in its structure. As another example, the so-called correcting block attackis applicable mainly to hash functions based on modular arithmetic.Birthday AttackThe idea behind this attack originates from a famous problem from probability theory, calledthe birthday paradox. The paradox can be stated as follows. What is the minimum number ofpupils in a classroom so the probability that at least two pupils have the same birthday is greaterthan 0:5? The answer to this question is 23, which is much smaller than the value suggested byintuition. The justication for the paradox is as follows. Suppose that the pupils are enteringthe classroom one at a time. The probability that the birthday of the rst pupil falls on a15
specic day of the year is equal to 1365. The probability that the birthday of the second pupilis not the same as the rst one is equal to 1   1365 . If the birthdays of the rst two pupils aredierent, the probability that the birthday of the third pupil is dierent from the rst one andthe second one is equal to 1  2365 . Consequently, the probability that t students have dierentbirthdays is equal to (1   1365)(1   2365) : : :(1   t 1365 ), and the probability that at least two ofthem have the same birthday isP = 1  (1  1365)(1  2365) : : :(1  t   1365 ):It can be easily computed that for t  23, this probability is greater than 0:5.The birthday paradox can be employed for attacking hash functions. Suppose that the numberof bits of the hash value is n. An adversary generates r1 variations of a bogus message andr2 variations of a genuine message. The probability of nding a bogus message and a genuinemessage that hash to the same digest isP  1  e  r1r22nwhere r2  1 (see Ohta and Koyama [46]). When r1 = r2 = 2n2 , the above probability is  0:63.Therefore any hashing algorithm which produces digests of length around 64 bits is insecure,since the time complexity function for the birthday attack is  232. It is usually recommendedthat the hash value should be around 128 bits to thwart the birthday attack.This method of attack does not take advantage of the structural properties of the hash schemeor its algebraic weaknesses. It applies to any hash scheme. In addition, it is assumed that thehash scheme assigns to a message a value which is chosen with a uniform probability among allthe possible hash values. Note that if the structure is weak or has certain algebraic properties,the digests do not have a uniform probability distribution. In such cases it may be possible tond colliding messages with a better probability and fewer message-digest pairs.Meet-in-the-middle attackThis is a variation of the birthday attack, but instead of comparing the digests, the intermediateresults in the chain are compared. The attack can be made against schemes which employ somesort of block chaining in their structure. In contrast to birthday attack, a meet-in-the-middleattack enables an attacker to construct a bogus message with a desired digest. In this attackthe message is divided into two parts. The attacker generates r1 variations on the rst part of abogus message. He starts from the initial value and goes forward to the intermediate stage. Healso generates r2 variations on the second part of the bogus message. He starts from the desiredfalse digest and goes backwards to the intermediate stage. The probability of a match in theintermediate stage is the same as the probability of success in the birthday attack.Correcting-block attackIn a correcting block attack, a bogus message is concatenated with a block to produce a correcteddigest of the desired value. This attack is often applied to the last block and is called correctinglast block attack, although it can be applied to other blocks as well. Hash functions based onmodular arithmetic are especially sensitive to the correcting last block attack (cf. Preneel [50]).The introduction of redundancy into the message in these schemes makes nding a correctingblock with the necessary redundancy dicult. However, it makes the scheme less ecient. Thediculty of nding a correcting block depends on the nature of the redundancy introduced. For16
example, Coppersmith [20] shows that the redundancy built into the CCITT hashing schemebased on modular squaring results in an insecure scheme.Biham and Shamir [11] have developed a method for attacking block ciphers, known as dier-ential cryptanalysis. This is a general method for attacking cryptographic algorithms, includinghashing schemes. For example, Berson [8] has applied dierential cryptanalysis to MD5.5 MACMessage authentication codes provide message integrity and are one of the most importantsecurity primitives in current distributed information systems. A Message Authentication Code(MAC) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that consists of two algorithms. A MACgeneration algorithm, G = fGk : k = 1; : : : ; Ng takes an arbitrary message, s, from a givencollection S of messages and produces a tag, t = Gk(s), which is appended to the message toproduce an authentic message, m = (s:t). A MAC verication algorithm, V = fVk(:) : k =1; : : : ; Ng, takes authenticated messages of the form (s:t), and produces a true or false value,depending on whether the message is authentic. The security of a MAC depends on the bestchance that an active spoofer has to successfully substitute a received message (s:Gk(s)) fora fraudulent one, m0 = (s0; t), so that Vk(m0) produces a true result. In MAC systems, thecommunicants share a secret key, and are therefore not distinguishable cryptographically.The security of MACs can be studied from the point of view of unconditional or computationalsecurity.Unconditionally secure MACs are equivalent to cartesian authentication codes. However, inMAC systems only multiple communications are of interest. In Section 2, A-codes that provideprotection for multiple transmissions were discussed. In the next section, we present a construc-tion for a MAC which has been the basis of all the recent MAC constructions and has a numberof important properties. It is provably secure; the number of key bits required is asymptoticallyminimal; and it has a fast implementation.Computationally secure MACs have arisen >from the needs of the banking community, cf. Pre-neel, Chaum, Fumy, Jansen, Landrock and Roelofsen [52]. They are also studied under othernames, such as keyed hash functions and keying hash functions. In Section 5.3, we review themain properties and constructions of such MACs.5.1 Unconditionally secure MACsWhen the enemy has unlimited computational resources, attacks against MAC systems and theanalysis of security are similar to that of cartesian A-codes. The enemy observes n codewords ofthe form si:ti, i = 1; : : : ; n, in the channel and attempts to construct a fraudulent codeword s:twhich is accepted by the receiver. (This is the same as spoong of order n in an A-code.) If thecommunicants want to limit the enemy's chance of success to p after n message transmissions,the number of authentication functions (number of keys) must be greater than a lower boundwhich depends on p. If the enemy's chance of success in spoong of order i; i = 1; : : : ; n, is pi,then at least 1=p1p2   pn keys are required, see Fak [28], Wegman and Carter [80] for a proofof this. For pi = p; i = 1; : : : ; n, the required number of key bits is  n log2 p. That is, for every17
message,   log2 p key bits are required. This is the absolute minimum for the required numberof key bits.Perfect protection is obtained when the enemy's best strategy is a random choice of a tag andappending it to the message; this strategy succeeds with probability p = 2 k , if the size of thetag is k bits. In this case the number of required key bits for every extra message is k.Wegman and Carter [80] give a general construction for unconditionally secure MACs that canbe used for providing protection for an arbitrary number of messages.Their construction uses universal classes of hash functions. Traditionally, a hash function is usedto achieve fast average performance over all inputs in varied applications, such as databases. Byusing a universal class of hash functions it is possible to achieve provable average performancewithout restricting the input distribution.Let h : A ! B be a hash function mapping the elements of a set A to a set B. A stronglyuniversaln class of hash function is a class of hash functions with the property that for n distinctelements a1; : : : ; an of A and n distinct elements b1; : : : ; bn of B, exactly jH j=(bn) functionsmap ai to bi, for i = 1; : : : ; n. Strongly universaln hash functions give perfect protection formultiple messages as follows. The transmitter and the receiver use a publicly known class ofstrongly universaln hash functions, and a shared secret key determines a particular member ofthe class that they will use for their communication. Stinson [70] shows that a class of stronglyuniversal2 that maps a set of a elements to a set of b elements is equivalent to an orthogonalarray OA(2; a; b) with  = jH j=b2. Similar results can be proved for strongly universaln classesof hash functions. Because of this equivalence, universaln hash functions are not a practicallyattractive solution. In particular, this proposal is limited by the constraints of constructingorthogonal arrays with arbitrary parameters. For a survey of known results on orthogonalarrays, see Beth, Jungnickel and Lenz [10].5.2 Wegman and Carter constructionWegman and Carter show that, instead of strongly universaln one can always use a stronglyuniversal2 family of hash functions, together with a one time pad of random numbers. Thesystem works as follows. Let B denote the set of tags consisting of the sequences of k bit strings.Let H denote a strongly universal2 class of hash functions mapping S to B. Two communicantsshare a key that species a function h 2 H together with a pad containing k-bit random numbers.The tag for the jth message sj is h(sj) rj, where rj is the jth number on the pad. It can beproved that this system limits the enemy's chance of success to 2 k as long as the pad is randomand not used repeatedly. The system requires nk+K bits of key, where K is the number of bitsrequired to specify an element of H, n is the number of messages to be authenticated, and k isthe size of the tags.This construction has a number of remarkable properties. Firstly, for large n the key requirementfor the system approaches the theoretical minimum of k bits per message. This is because forlarge n the number of key bits is eectively determined by nk. Secondly, the construction of MACwith provable security for multiple communications is eectively reduced to the construction of abetter studied primitive, that is, strongly universal2 class of hash functions. Finally, by replacingthe one-time pad with a pseudorandom sequence generator, unconditional security is replacedby computational security. 18
Wegman and Carter's important observation is as follows. By not insisting on the minimumvalue for the probability of success in spoong of order one, i.e. allowing p1 > 1=k, it is possibleto reduce the number of functions, and thus the required number of keys. This observation leadsto the notion of almost strongly universal2 class.An -almost universal2 (or -AU2) class of hash functions has the following property. For anypair x; y 2 A; x 6= y, the number of hash functions h with h(x) = h(y) is at most equal to .The -almost strongly-universal2 (or -ASU2) hash functions have the added property that forany x 2 A; y 2 B the number of functions with h(x) = y is jH j=jBj. Using an -almost strongly-universal2 class of functions in the Wegman and Carter construction results in MAC systemsfor which the probability of success for an intruder is . Such MACs are called -otp-secure, seeKrawczyk [38].Stinson [72] gives several methods for combining hash functions of class AU2 and ASU2. Thefollowing theorem shows that an -ASU2 class can be constructed >from an -AU2 class.Theorem 3 [72] Suppose H1 is an 1-AU2 class of hash functions >from A1 to B1, and supposeH2 is an 2-ASU2 class of hash functions from B1 to B2. Then there exists an -ASU2 class Hof hash functions from A1 to B2, where  = 1 + 2 and jH j = jH1j  jH2j.This theorem further reduces the construction of MACs with provable security to the construc-tion of -AU2 class of hash functions.Several constructions for -ASU2 hash functions are given by Stinson [72]. Johansson et al[37] establish relationships between ASU2 hash functions and error correcting codes. They usegeometric error correcting codes to construct new classes of -ASU2 hash function of smallersize. This reduces the key size.Krawczyk [38] shows that in the Wegman-Carter construction, -ASU2 hash functions can bereplaced with a less demanding class of hash functions, called -otp-secure. The denition ofthis class diers from other classes of hash functions, in that it is directly related to MACconstructions and their security; in particular, to the Wegman-Carter construction.Let s 2 S denote a message that is to be authenticated by a k bit tag h(s) r, constructed byWegman and Carter's method. An enemy succeeds in a spoong attack if he can nd s0 6= s,t0 = h(s0)  r, assuming that he knows H but does not know h and r. A class H of hashfunctions is -otp-secure if for any message no adversary succeeds in the above attack scenariowith probability greater than .Theorem 4 [38] A necessary and sucient condition for a family H of hash functions to be-otp-secure is that 8a1 6= a2; c; Prh(h(a1) h(a2) = c)  :The need for high speed MACs has increased with the progress in high speed data communi-cation. A successful approach to the construction of such MACs uses hash function families inwhich the message is hashed by multiplying it by a binary matrix. Because hashing is achievedwith exclusive-or operations, it can be eciently implemented in software. An obvious candidatefor such a class of hash functions, originally proposed by Wegman and Carter [13, 80], is theset of linear transformations from A to B. It is shown that this forms an -AU2 class of hashfunctions. However the size of the key { the number of entries in the matrix { is too large,19
and too many operations are required for hashing. Later proposals by Krawczyk [38] and byRogaway [61] are aimed at alleviating these problems, and have a fast software implementation.The former uses Topelitz matrices [38], while the latter uses binary matrices with only threeones per column. In both cases, the resulting family is -AU2.The design of a complete MAC usually involves a number of hash functions which are combinedby methods, similar to those proposed by Stinson [72]. The role of some of the hash functions isto produce high compression (small b), while others produce the desired spread and uniformity(see Rogaway [61]).Reducing the key size of the hash function is especially important in practical applications,because the one-time pad is replaced by the output of a pseudorandom generator with a shortkey (of the order of 128 bits). Hence it is desirable to have the key size of the hash function ofsimilar order.5.3 Computational securityIn the computationally secure approach, protection is achieved because excessive computationis required for a successful forgery. Although a hash value can be used as a checksum to detectrandom changes in the data, a secret key must be used to provide protection against activetampering. Methods for constructing MACs from hash functions have traditionally followed oneof the following approaches: the so-called hash-then-encrypt and keying a hash function.Hash-then-encryptTo construct a MAC for a message x with this method, the hash value of x is calculated andthe result is encrypted using an encryption algorithm. This is similar to signature generation,where a public key algorithm is replaced by a private key encryption function.There are a number of drawbacks to this method. First, the overall scheme is slow. Thisis because the two primitives used in the construction, i.e. the cryptographic hash functionsand encryption functions, are designed for other purposes and have extra security propertieswhich are not strictly required in the construction. Although this construction can producea secure MAC, the speed of the MAC is bounded by the speed of its constituent algorithms.For example, cryptographic hash functions are designed to be one-way. It is not clear whetherthis is a required property in the hash-then-encrypt construction, where the output of the hashfunction is encrypted and one-wayness is eectively obtained through the diculty of ndingthe plaintext from the ciphertext.A serious shortcoming of this method is that existing export restrictions, which usually applyto encryption functions, are inherited by MACs constructed using this method.Keying a hash functionIn the second approach a secret key is incorporated into a hashing algorithm. This operation issometimes called keying a hash function (see Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [5]). This method isattractive, because of the availability of hashing algorithms and their relative speed in softwareimplementation; these algorithms are not subject to export restrictions.Although this scheme can be implemented more eciently in software than the previous scheme,the objection to the superuous properties of the hash functions remains.The keying method depends on the structure of the hash function. Tsudik [78] proposes three20
methods of incorporating the key into the data. In the secret prex method, Gk(s) = H(kks),while in the secret sux, we have Gk(s) = H(skk). Finally, the envelope method combines theprevious two methods with Gk(s) = H(k1kskk2) and k = k1kk2.Instead of including the key into the data, the key information can be included into the hashingalgorithm. In iterative hash functions such as MD5 and SHA, the key can be incorporated intothe initial vector, compression function or into the output transformation.There have also been some attempts at dening and constructing secure keyed hash functionsas independent primitives, namely by Berson, Gong and Lomas [9] and Bakhtiari, Safavi-Nainiand Pieprzyk [1]. The former propose a set of criteria for secure keyed hash functions and giveconstructions using one-way hash functions. The latter argue that the suggested criteria forsecurity is in most cases excessive; relaxing these allows constructions of more ecient securekeyed hash functions. Bakhtiari et al also give a design of a keyed hash function from scratch.Their design is based mostly on intuitive principles and lacks a rigorous proof of security. Asimilar approach is taken in the design of MDx-MAC by Preneel and van Oorschot [53], whichis a scheme for constructing a MAC from an MD5-type hash function. It is conjectured that ifMDx is a secure hash function, then MDx-MAC is a secure MAC.5.3.1 Security analysis of computationally secure MACsThe security analysis of computational secure MACs has followed two dierent approaches. Inthe rst approach, the security assessment is based on an analysis of some possible attacks. Inthe second approach, a security model is developed and used to examine the proposed MAC.Security analysis through attacksConsider a MAC algorithm that produces MACs of length m using a k bit key. In generalan attack might result in a successful forgery, or in the recovery of the key. According to theclassication given by Preneel and van Oorschot [54], a forgery in a MAC can be either existential{ the opponent can construct a valid message and MAC without the knowledge of the key pair,or selective { the opponent can determine the MAC for a message of his choice. Protectionagainst the former type of attack imposes more stringent conditions than the latter type ofattack. A forgery is veriable if the attacker can determine with a high probability whether theattack is successful. In a chosen text attack the attacker is given the MACs for the messages ofhis own choice. In an adaptive attack the attacker chooses text for which he can see the resultof his previous request before forming his next request. In a key recovery attack the aim of theattacker is to nd the key. If the attacker is successful, he can perform selective forgery on anymessage of his choice and the security of the system is totally compromised.For an ideal MAC any method to nd the key is as expensive as an exhaustive search of O(2k)operations. If m < k, the attacker may randomly choose the MAC for a message with theprobability of success equal to 1=2m. However, in this attack the attacker cannot verify whetherhis attack has been successful.The complexity of various attacks is discussed by several authors: Tsudik [78], Bakhtiari et al[2], Bellare et al [6]. Preneel and van Oorschot [53, 54] propose constructions resistant to suchattacks. Some attacks can be applied to all MACs obtained using a specic construction methodwhile other attacks are limited to particular instances of the method.21
5.3.2 Formal security analysisThe main attempts at formalizing the security analysis of computationally secure MACs aredue to Bellare et al [5], and Bellare and Rogaway [7]. In both papers, an attack model is rstlycarefully dened and the security of a MAC with respect to that model is considered. Bellareet al [5] use their model to prove the security of a generic construction based on pseudorandomfunctions, while Bellare and Rogaway [7] use their model to prove the security of a genericconstruction based on hash functions.MAC from pseudorandom functionsThe formal denition of security given by Bellare et al [7] assumes that the enemy can ask thetransmitter to construct tags for messages of his choice, and also ask the receiver to verify chosenmessage and tag pairs. The number of these requests is limited, and a limited time t can bespent on the attack. Security of the MAC is expressed as an upper bound on the enemy's chanceof succeeding in its best attack.The construction proposed by Bellare et al applies to any pseudorandom function. Their pro-posal, called XOR-MAC, basically breaks a message into blocks. For each block the output of thepseudorandom function is calculated, and the outputs are nally XORed. Two schemes basedon this approach are proposed: the randomized XOR scheme and the counter based scheme.The pseudorandom function used in the above construction can be an encryption function, likeDES, or a hash function, like MD5. It is proved that the counter based scheme is more securethan the randomized scheme, and if DES is used, both schemes are more secure than CBC MAC.Some of the desirable features of this construction are parallelizability and incrementality. Theformer means that message blocks can be fed into the pseudorandom function in parallel. Thelatter refers to the feature of calculating incrementally the value of the MAC for a message s0which diers from s in only a few blocks.MAC from hash functionsThe model used by Bellare and Rogaway [5] is similar to the above one. The enemy can obtaininformation by asking queries; however, in this case queries are only addressed to the transmitter.A family of functions fFkg is (, t, q, L)-secure MAC [6] if any adversary that is not given thekey k, is limited to spend total time t, and sees the values of the function Fk computed on qmessages s1; s2;    ; sq of its choice, each of length at most L, cannot nd a message and tagpair (s; t), s 6= si; i = 1; : : :q, such that t = Fk(s) with probability better that .Two general constructions for MAC from hash functions, the so-called NMAC (the Nestedconstruction) and HMAC (the Hash based MAC) are given and their security is formally proved.Theorem 5 [5] If the keyed compression function f is a (f , t, q, L)-secure MAC and the keyediterated hash function F is (F , t, q, L)-weakly collision-resistant then the NMAC is (f + F ,t, q, L)-secure MAC.Weak collision-resistance is a much weaker notion than the collision resistance of (unkeyed) hashfunctions, because the enemy does not know the secret key and nding collision is much moredicult in this case. More precisely, a family of keyed hash functions fFkg is (, t, q, L)-weaklycollision-resistant if any adversary that is not given the key k, is limited to spend total time t,22
and sees the values of the function Fk computed on q messagesm1; m2; : : : ; mq of its choice, eachof length at most L, cannot nd messages m and m0 for which Fk(m) = Fk(m0) with probabilitybetter that .With some extra assumptions similar results are proved for the HMAC construction.A related construction is the collisionful keyed hash function proposed by Gong [33]. In hisconstruction, the collisions are selectable and the resulting function is claimed to provide securityagainst password guessing attacks. Bakhtiari, Safavi-Naini and Pieprzyk [3], [4] explore thesecurity of Gong's function and a key exchange protocol based on collisionful hash functions.5.4 ApplicationsThe main application of a MAC is to provide protection against active spoong (see Wegman andCarter [13]). This is particularly important in open distributed systems such as the Internet.Other applications include secure password checking and software protection. MACs can beused to construct encryption functions and have been used in authentication protocols in placeof encryption functions (cf. Bird, Gopal, Herzberg, Janson, Kutten, Molva and Yung [12]).An important advantage of MAC functions is that they are not subject to export restrictions.Other applications of MAC functions are to protect software against viruses (cf. Radai [56]),or to protect computer les against tampering. Integrity checking is an important service in acomputer operating system which can be automated with software tools.6 DIGITAL SIGNATURESDigital signatures are meant to be electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They shouldpreserve the main features of handwritten signatures. Obviously, it is desirable that digitalsignatures be as legally binding as handwritten ones. There are three elements in every signature:the signer, the document, and the time of signing.In most cases, the document already includes a timestamp. A digital signature must reect boththe content of the document and the identity of the signer. The signer is uniquely identied byits secret key. In particular, we require the signature to be: unique { a given signature reects the document and can be generated by the signer only; unforgeable { it must be computationally intractable for an opponent to forge the signature; easy to generate by the signer and easy to verify by recipients; and impossible to deny by the signer (non-repudiation).A digital signature diers from a handwritten signature in that it is not physically attachedto the document on a piece of paper. Digital signatures have to be related both to the signerand the document by a cryptographic algorithm. Signatures can be veried by any potentialrecipient. Therefore, the verication algorithm must be public. Signature verication succeedsonly when the signer and document match the signature.There are two general classes of signature schemes:23
 one-time signature schemes, and multiple signature schemes.One-time signature schemes can be used to sign only one message. To sign a second message,the signature scheme has to be re-initialized; however, any signature can be veried repeatedly.Multiple signature schemes can be used to sign several messages without the necessity to re-initialize the signature scheme.In practice, a signature scheme is required to provide a relatively short signature for a documentof an arbitrary length. We sign the document by generating a signature for its digest. Thehashing employed to produce the digest must be secure and collision free.6.1 One-time signature schemesThis class of signature schemes can be implemented using any one-way function. These schemeswere rst developed using private key cryptosystems. We follow the original notation. Anencryption algorithm is used as a one-way function. To set up the signature scheme, the signerchooses a one-way function (encryption algorithm). The signer selects an index k (secret key)randomly and uniformly from the set of keys, K. The index determines an instance of theone-way function, i.e., Ek : n ! n where  = f0; 1g; it is known only by the signer. Notethat n has to be large enough to avoid birthday attacks.Lamport schemeLamport's scheme [40] generates signatures for n-bit messages. To sign a message, the signerrst chooses randomly n key pairs:(K10; K11); (K20; K21); : : : ; (Kn0; Kn1): (1)The pairs of keys are kept secret and are known to the signer only. Next, the signer creates twosequences, S and R: S = f(S10; S11); (S20; S21); : : : ; (Sn0; Sn1)g;R = f(R10; R11); (R20; R21); : : : ; (Rn0; Rn1)g: (2)The elements of S are selected randomly and the elements of R are cryptograms of S soRij = EKij(Sij) for i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 0; 1; (3)where EK is the encryption function of the selected symmetric cryptosystem. S and R are storedin a read-only public register; they are known by the receivers.The signature of a n-bit message M = (m1; : : : ; mn), mi 2 f0; 1g for i = 1; : : : ; n, is a sequenceof cryptographic keys: S(M) = fK1i1; K2i2; : : : ; Kning (4)where ij = 0 if mj = 0; otherwise ij = 1, j = 1; : : : ; n. A receiver validates the signature S(M)by verifying whether suitable pairs of S and R match each other for known keys.Rabin schemeIn Rabin's scheme [55], a signer begins the construction of the signature by generating 2r keysat random: K1; K2; : : : ; K2r: (5)24
The parameter r is determined by the security requirements. The Ki are secret and known onlyto the signer. Next, the signer creates two sequences which are needed by the recipients to verifythe signature. The rst sequence, S = fS1; S2; : : : ; S2rgcomprises of binary blocks chosen at random by the signer. The second,R = fR1; R2; : : : ; R2rgis created using the sequence S, Ri = EKi(Si) for i = 1; : : : ; 2r: S and R are stored in a read-onlypublic register.The signature is generated using the following steps. The message to be signed M is encipheredunder keys K1; : : : ; K2r. The cryptograms:EK1(M); : : : ; EK2r(M) (6)form the signature S(M). The pair (S(M);M) is sent to the receivers.To verify the signature, a receiver selects randomly a 2r-bit sequence  of r-ones and r-zeros.A copy of  is forwarded to the signer. Using , the signer forms an r-element subset of thekeys with the property that Ki belongs to the subset if and only if the i-th element of the 2r-bitsequence is `1'; i = 1; : : : ; 2r. The subset of keys is then communicated to the receiver. Toverify the key subset, the receiver generates and compares r suitable cryptograms of S with theoriginals kept in the public register.Matyas-Meyer schemeMatyas and Meyer [41] propose a signature scheme based on the DES algorithm. However, anyone-way function can be used in the scheme.The signer rst selects a random matrix U = [ui;j ] i = 1; : : : ; 30, j = 1; : : : ; 31 and ui;j 2 n.Using U , a 31  31 matrix KEY = [ki;j ] is constructed for ki;j 2 n. The rst row of KEYmatrix is chosen at random, the other rows are:ki+1;j = Eki;j (ui;j)for i = 1; : : : ; 30 and j = 1; : : : ; 31. Finally, the signer installs in a public registry the matrix Uand the vector (k31;1; : : : ; k31;31) (the last row of KEY ).To sign a message m 2 n the cryptogramsci = Ek31;i(m) for i = 1; : : : ; 31are computed. The cryptograms are considered as integers and ordered according to their valuesso ci1 < ci2 <    < ci31 . The signature of m is the sequence of keysSGk(m) = (ki1;1; ki2;2; : : : ; ki31;31):The verier takes the message m, recreates the cryptograms ci and orders them in increasingorder. Next, the signature-keys are put into the `empty' matrix KEY in the entries indicated bythe ordered sequence of ci's. The verier then repeats the signer's steps and computes all keysbelow the keys of the signature. The signature is accepted if the last row of KEY is identicalto the row stored in the registry. 25
6.2 Signature schemes based on public-key cryptosystemsRSA signature schemeFirst, a signer sets up the RSA system [59] with the modulus N = p q, where the two primesp and q are xed. Next a random decryption key d 2 ZN is chosen; the encryption key e ise d  1 (mod (p  1; q   1)):The signer publishes both the modulus N and the decryption key d.Given a message M 2 ZN , the signature generated by the signer isS M e (mod N):Since the decryption key is public, anyone can verify whetherM  Sd (mod N):The signature is considered to be valid if this congruence is satised. RSA signatures are subjectto various attacks which exploit the commutativity of exponentiation.ElGamal signature schemeThe signature scheme due to ElGamal [27] is based on the discrete logarithm problem. The signerchooses a nite eld GF (p) for a suciently large prime p. A primitive element g 2 GF (p) anda random integer r 2 GF (p) are xed. Next the signer computesK  gr (mod p)and announces K, g and p. To sign a message M 2 GF (p), the signer selects a random integerR 2 GF (p) such that gcd (R; p  1) = 1 and calculatesX  gR (mod p):Using this data following congruence is solvedM  r X +R Y (mod p  1)for Y using Euclid's algorithm. The signature of M is the triple (M;X; Y ). Note that r and Rare kept secret by the signer. The recipient of the signed message formsA  KXXY (mod p)and accepts the message M as authentic if A  gM (mod p). It is worth noting that knowledgeof the pair (X; Y ), does not reveal the message M . As a matter of fact, there are many pairsmatching the message { for every pair (r; R) there is a pair (X; Y ).Since discrete exponent systems can be based on any cyclic group, the ElGamal signature schemecan be extended to this setting. A modication of ElGamal's signature was proposed as a DigitalSignature Standard (DSS) in 1991 ([45]). 26
6.3 Special signaturesSometimes additional conditions are imposed upon digital signatures. Blind signatures areuseful in situations where the message to be signed should not be revealed to the signer. Unliketypical digital signatures, the undeniable versions require the participation of the signer in orderto verify the signature. Fail-stop signatures are used whenever there is a need for protectionagainst a very powerful adversary. As these signatures require interactions amongst the partiesinvolved, the signatures are sometimes called signature protocols.Blind SignaturesThe concept of blind signatures was introduced by Chaum [18]. They are applicable to situationswhere the holder of a message M needs to get M signed by a signer (which could be a publicregistry) without revealing the message. This can be done with the following steps. The holder of the message rst encrypts it. The holder sends a cryptogram of the message to the signer. The signer generates the signature for the cryptogram and sends it back to the holder. The holder decodes the encryption and obtains the signature of the message.This scheme works if the encryption and signature operations commute, for example, the RSAscheme can be used to implement blind signatures.Assume that the signer has set up a RSA signature scheme with modulus N and public decryp-tion key d. The holder of the message M selects at random an integer k 2 ZN and computesthe cryptogram C M  kd (mod N):The cryptogram C is now sent to the signer who computes the blind signatureSC  (M  kd)e (mod N):The blind signature SC is returned to the holder who computes the signature for M as followsSM  SC  k 1 M e (mod N):It is not necessary to have special signature schemes to generate blind signatures. It is enoughfor the holder of the message to use a secure hash function h(). To get a (blind) signature fromthe signer, the holder rst compresses the message M using h(). The digest D = h(M) is sentto the signer. After signing the digest, the signature SGk(D) is communicated to the holderwho attaches the message M to the signature SGk(D). Note that the signer cannot recover themessage M from the digest, since h() is a one-way hash function. Also the holder cannot cheatby attaching a `false' message unless collisions for the hash function can be found.Undeniable SignaturesThe concept of undeniable signatures is due to Chaum and van Antwerpen [19]. The characteris-tic feature of undeniable signatures is that signatures cannot be veried without the co-operationof the signer. Assume we have selected a large prime p and a primitive element g 2 GF (p).27
Both p and g are public. The signer randomly selects its secret k 2 GF (p) and announces gk(mod p). For a message M , the signer creates the signatureS Mk (mod p):Verication needs the co-operation of the verier and signer, and proceeds as follows. The verier selects two random numbers a; b 2 GF (p) and sends C  Sa(gk)b (mod p)to the signer. The signer computes k 1 such that k  k 1  1 (mod p   1) and returns d = Ck 1 Ma  gb (mod p) to the verier. The verier accepts or rejects the signature as genuine depending on whether d Magb(mod p).There are two possible ways in which a verication can fail. Either the signer has tried todisavow a genuine signature or the signature is indeed false. The rst possibility is preventedby incorporating a disavowal protocol. The protocol requires two runs for verication. In therst run, the verier randomly selects two integers a1; b1 2 GF (p) and sends C1  Sa1(gk)b1(mod p) to the signer. The signer returns d1 = Ck 11 to the verier. The verier checks whetherd1 6= Ma1  gb1 (mod p):If the congruence is not satised, the verier repeats the process using a dierent pair a2; b2 2GF (p). The verier concludes that S is a forgery if and only if(d1g b1)a2  (d2g b2)a1 (mod p);otherwise, the signer is cheating.Fail-Stop SignaturesThe concept of fail-stop signatures was introduced by Ptzmann and Waidner [48]. Fail-stopsignatures protect signatures against a powerful adversary. As usual the signature is producedby a signer who holds a particular secret key. There are, however, many other keys which can beused to produce the same signature and which thus work with the original public key. There isa high probability that the key chosen by the adversary diers from the key held by the signer.Fail-stop signatures provide signing and verication algorithms as well as an algorithm to detectforgery.Let k be a secret key known to the signer only and K be the public key. The signature ona message M is denoted as s = SGk(M). A fail-stop signature must satisfy the followingconditions: An opponent with unlimited computational power can forge a signature with a negligibleprobability. More precisely, an opponent who knows the pair (s = SGk(M);M) and thesigner's public key K, can create a collection of all keys Ks;M such that k 2 Ks;M if andonly if s = SGk(M) = SGk(M). The size of Ks;M has to increase exponentially as afunction of the security parameter n. Not knowing the secret k, the opponent can onlyrandomly chose an element from Ks;M . Let this element be k. If the opponent signsanother message M 6= M , it is a requirement that s = SGk(M) 6= SGk(M) with aprobability close to one. 28
 There is a polynomial-time algorithm which produces a proof of forgery as output, whengiven the following inputs: a secret key k, a public key K, a message M , a valid signatures, and a forged signature s. A signer with polynomially bounded computing power cannot construct a valid signaturewhich it can later deny by proving it to be a forgery.Clearly, after the signer has provided a proof of forgery, the scheme is compromised and is nolonger used. This is why it is called `fail-stop'.7 Research Issues and SummaryIn this chapter we discussed: Authentication, Hashing, Message Authentication Codes (MACs),and Digital Signatures. We have presented the fundamental ideas underlying each topic andindicated the current research developments in these topics. This is reected in our bibliography.We shall now summarize the topics covered in this chapter.Authentication deals with the problem of providing assurance to a receiver that a communicatedmessage originates from a particular transmitter, and that the received message has the samecontent as the transmitted message. A typical and widely used application of authenticationoccurs in computer networks. Here the problem is to provide a protocol to establish the identityof two parties wishing to communicate or make transactions via the network. Motivated by suchapplications, the theory of authentication codes has developed into a mature area of research,drawing from several areas of mathematics.Hashing algorithms provide a relatively short digest of a much longer input. Hashing must satisfythe critical requirement that the digests of two distinct messages are distinct. A widely usedtype of hashing functions are constructed from block encryption ciphers. They have numerousapplications in cryptology. Algebraic methods have also been proposed as a source of goodhashing functions. These oer some provable security properties.Message Authentication Codes or (MACs), are symmetric key primitives providing message in-tegrity against active spoong, by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message which isveriable only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication is one of themost important ways of ensuring the integrity of information which is communicated by elec-tronic means. This is especially relevant in the rapidly developing sphere of electronic commerce.Digital signatures are the electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They are designedso as to preserve the essential features of handwritten signatures. They can be used to signelectronic documents and have potential application in legal contexts.8 Dening Termsauthentication : is one of the main two goals of cryptography (the other is secrecy). Anauthentication system ensures that massages which are transmitted over a communicationchannel are authentic.cryptology: is the art/science of design and analysis of cryptographic systems.29
digital signatures : an asymmetric cryptographic primitive which is the digital counterpartof a signature and links a document to a unique person.encryption algorithm: transforms an input text by \mixing" it with a randomly chosen bitstring { the key, to produce the cipher text. In a symmetric encryption algorithm, theplain text can be recovered by applying the key to the cipher text.hashing: hashing is accomplished by applying a function to an arbitrary length message tocreate a digest/hash value, which is usually of xed length.key: an input provided by the user of a cryptographic system. This piece of information is keptsecret and is the source of security in a cryptographic system. Although some times a partof key information is made public, in which case the secret part is the source of security.message authentication codes : is a symmetric cryptographic primitive that is used for pro-viding authenticity.plain text, cipher text: the cipher text is the \scrambled" version of an original source { theplain text. It is assumed that the scrambled text, produced by an encryption algorithm,can be inspected by persons not having the key and not reveal the content of the source.9 Further InformationCurrent research in cryptology is represented in the Proceedings the conferences: CRYPTO,EUROCRYPT, ASIACRYPT, AUSCRYPT. There are also more specialized conferences deal-ing with topics such as: hashing, fast software encryption, and security. The proceedings arepublished by Springer in their LNCS series. The Journal of Cryptology, IEEE Proceedings on In-formation Theory, Designs Codes and Cryptography and several other journals publish extendedversions of the articles which were presented in the above mentioned conferences.AcknowledgmentsWe thank Anish Mathuria for all his comments and suggestions which have greatly helped usimprove our exposition.References[1] S. Bakhtiari, R. Safavi-Naini, and J. Pieprzyk. Keyed hash functions. Cryptography: Policyand Algorithms Conference, LNCS Vol. 1029, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995, pp. 201-214.[2] S. Bakhtiari, R. Safavi-Naini, and J. Pieprzyk. Practical and secure message authentica-tion. Proc. Second Annual Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC'95), Ottawa,Canada, May 1995, pp. 55-68.[3] S. Bakhtiari, R. Safavi-Naini, and J. Pieprzyk. On selectable collisionful hash functions.Proc. Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, LNCS Vol. 1172,Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1996, pp. 287-294.30
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